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ABSTRACT
The first Justice John Marshall Harlan’s status as one of the greatest Supreme Court Justices in
American history rests largely upon his civil rights jurisprudence. The literature exploring the
nuances of Harlan’s civil rights jurisprudence is vast. Far less attention has been paid to the
reasons for Harlan’s strong civil rights views. Developing a rich sense of Harlan’s thinking has
been difficult because Harlan did not leave behind a large trove of non-judicial writings. There is,
however, a remarkable source of Harlan’s thought that has been largely overlooked by scholars:
Harlan’s constitutional law lectures at George Washington Law School of 1897–1898. These
lectures are currently housed in the Harlan papers in the Library of Congress, but they have never
been published, have rarely been cited, and are largely unknown.
These lectures provide extraordinary insight into Harlan’s civil rights jurisprudence. In these
lectures, Harlan lays out a remarkable and surprising theory of racial hierarchy—with AngloSaxons as the superior group—that seems to be at complete odds with his egalitarian civil rights
jurisprudence. He also was a staunch opponent of the immigration of inferior racial groups to the
United States—particularly the Chinese.
But Harlan’s theory of racial superiority did not, for the most part, lead him to disregard the rights
of those citizens whom he considered to be racially inferior. On the contrary, although Harlan
argued that Anglo-Saxons were the superior racial group and that all other racial groups in the
nation would eventually die out, he also contended that Anglo-Saxons would preserve their
superior status only if they fulfilled their sacred duty to protect the liberty interests of those citizens
who had traditionally been subjugated in America—particularly African Americans.
Accordingly, despite Harlan’s embrace of a robust theory of racial supremacy, Harlan emerged as
the greatest civil rights jurist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

I. INTRODUCTION
The first Justice John Marshall Harlan has been rightly regarded as the
most important judicial proponent of the constitutional rights of African
Americans of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed,
Dean and Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. Many
thanks to Professors Michael Curtis, Paul Finkelman, and the Cornell Law School faculty
for their comments on earlier versions of this Article.
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Harlan’s status as one of the greatest Supreme Court Justices in American
1
history rests largely upon his civil rights jurisprudence. One can certainly
question whether Harlan was consistent in his embrace of African-American
rights—for example, he saw no constitutional impediment to anti2
miscegenation laws —but Harlan nevertheless deserves his place as the most
3
vigorous judicial champion of black rights of his era.
The literature exploring the nuances of Harlan’s civil rights
4
jurisprudence is extensive. Far less attention has been paid to the reasons

1

2

3

4

In 1970, a large group of law professors, historians, and political scientists identified
Harlan to be one of the twelve “great” Justices in American history (and one of only four
from the nineteenth century). HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 412 (3d ed. 1992).
Ironically, many scholars and jurists largely ignored Harlan’s work for several decades
after his death. Henry J. Abraham, John Marshall Harlan: A Justice Neglected, 41 VA. L. REV.
871, 871–72 (1955). But Harlan’s reputation soared following the Court’s 1954 decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which was widely viewed as a
vindication of Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
Harlan’s reputation today rests in significant measure on his dissenting opinions in Plessy
and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883). In fact, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy has
achieved almost mythic status.
Harlan’s views on anti-miscegenation laws are largely unknown, because he never had
occasion to consider such laws while serving on the Court, and his extra-judicial
statements on the issue are obscure. Harlan did consider the constitutionality of
imposing greater penalties on interracial fornication than on same-race fornication in
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), and joined a unanimous Court in finding no
constitutional impediment to such distinctions, but he never had cause, as a Justice, to
consider the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws. Id. at 585. In 1907, Harlan,
along with Charles Henry Butler, the Reporter of the United States Supreme Court,
published a little-known and rarely cited treatise on marriage law that strongly suggested
that state laws banning interracial marriage were constitutional. JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
& CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, MARRIAGE: A TREATISE (1907). On the question of whether
the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from prohibiting marriage between citizens of
different races, Harlan and Butler referred their readers to the relevant section of a 1903
constitutional law treatise by George F. Tucker that explained that “a statute prohibiting
the marriage relation between white persons and persons of African descent in no way
impairs their legal rights or denies to them equal protection of the laws.” George F. Tucker,
Constitutional Law, in 8 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1074 (William Mack &
Howard P. Nash eds., 1903) (emphasis added); see HARLAN & BUTLER, supra, at 26 n.36
(providing that for “[d]eprivation of equal protection of laws by such [antimiscegenation] statutes,” readers should consult the Tucker treatise).
Similarly, Harlan was among the Court’s strongest proponents of the constitutional rights
of residents of territory acquired by the United States in the wake of the SpanishAmerican War, as reflected in a number of powerful dissenting opinions in cases in which
Court majorities refused to extend constitutional rights to the residents of those
territories. See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.
As one example, see ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (discussing
several of Harlan’s noteworthy opinions in civil rights cases and their role in shaping the
argument for a “color blind” Constitution).
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5

for Harlan’s strong civil rights views. Developing a rich sense of Harlan’s
thinking has been difficult because Harlan did not leave behind a large
trove of non-judicial writings. There is, however, a remarkable source of
Harlan’s thought that has been almost completely overlooked by scholars
but that significantly expands our understanding of his civil rights
jurisprudence: Harlan’s constitutional law lectures of 1897–1898.
Harlan taught law for twenty years at Columbian University (which was
6
renamed to George Washington University in 1904). Indeed, at the end of
7
his life, Harlan estimated that he had taught 10,000 law students, and
described his law school teaching as “part of my life-work—and the most
8
interesting part.” During the 1897–1898 academic year, Harlan taught a
year-long course in constitutional law comprised of twenty-six lectures. Two
law students took down the lectures in shorthand and later transcribed
9
them, producing a typed manuscript of almost 500 pages. These lectures
are currently housed in the Harlan papers in the Library of Congress, but

5

6

7
8
9

But see James W. Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother?, 15 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 159, 161 (1993) (attempting to explain Justice Harlan’s strong civil rights
jurisprudence by arguing that Harlan may have had a black brother).
Columbian Law School Banquet, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1897, at 9; Richard D. Harlan, Justice
Harlan and the Game of Golf, 62 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 626, 627 (1917). Harlan’s primary course
at George Washington was constitutional law, but Harlan typically taught a second course,
which, over the years, included commercial law, conflict of laws, corporate law, evidence,
insurance law, international law, personal property, and torts. See, e.g. Florian Bartosic,
The Constitution, Civil Liberties and John Marshall Harlan, 46 KY. L.J. 407, 414 n.41 (1958);
Busy Day for Bryan, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1897, at 4; Columbian University Law School, WASH.
POST, Oct. 14, 1900, at 24; Lectures at Columbian: Well-Known Speakers Before the School of
Jurisprudence and Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1901, at 12; University Notes, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 1900, at 12; Enoch Aquila Chase, Some Recollections of Justice John Marshall
Harlan (unpublished and undated), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, Reel
13 (Library of Cong.).
Letter from E. Polk Johnson to John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 24, 1911), microformed on
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 8.
Letter from John M. Harlan to Walter C. Clephane (Aug. 4, 1910), microformed on JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 13.
Letter from George Johannes to Hon. John Marshal [sic] Harlan (Oct. 21, 1955),
microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 8. In 1955, one of
these two students, George Johannes, sent the transcription to Harlan’s grandson, John
Marshall Harlan II, who had recently been appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower to
serve on the United States Supreme Court. Id. The typed transcriptions, where it is
possible to compare with simultaneous transcriptions by newspaper reporters, appear to
have been highly accurate. A reporter from the Washington Post covered Harlan’s February 19, 1898 lecture. The Post article quoted the final 250–300 words of Harlan’s lecture
in which the Justice addressed the national controversy that had erupted after the sinking
of the Maine. Justice Harlan’s Advice: Americans Should Keep Cool and Avoid Hasty
Conclusions, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1898, at 1. The students’ transcription and the Post
reporter’s transcription are remarkably similar.
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they have never been published, have rarely been cited, and are largely
10
unknown.
Harlan’s constitutional law lectures provide extraordinary insight into his
civil rights jurisprudence. In these lectures, Harlan lays out a remarkable
and surprising theory of racial hierarchy—with Anglo-Saxons as the superior
group—that seems to be at complete odds with his egalitarian civil rights
jurisprudence. But Harlan’s theory of racial superiority did not, for the
most part, lead him to disregard the rights of those persons whom he
considered to be racially inferior. On the contrary, although Harlan argued
that Anglo-Saxons were the superior racial group and that all other racial
groups in the nation would eventually die out, he also contended that
Anglo-Saxons would preserve their superior status only if they fulfilled what
Harlan believed to be their sacred duty to protect the liberty of all persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, even those persons who had
traditionally been subjugated in America such as African Americans.
Accordingly, despite his embrace of a robust theory of racial supremacy,
Harlan emerged as the greatest civil rights jurist of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Part I of this Article considers Harlan’s strong sense of racial hierarchy,
and the obligation of Anglo-Saxons as the superior racial group to safeguard
the rights of inferior groups as part of their sacred call to preserve AngloAmerican traditions of liberty. Part II explores the tension between Harlan’s
robust support for race-based immigration policies and his deep commitment to the protection of the liberty of racial and ethnic minorities.
Harlan was a man of rich contradictions. Although Harlan stood largely
alone among late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists for his
support of black rights, his civil rights vision was grounded upon an
exceedingly complex and contradictory world view infused with racial
hierarchy and racial paternalism.

I. HARLAN’S NOTIONS OF RACIAL HIERARCHY
Harlan’s well-known concern for the political and civil rights of African
Americans went hand-in-hand with his little-known embrace of notions of
racial and ethnic hierarchy, with Anglo-Saxons as the preeminent group.
Harlan’s 1897–1898 constitutional law lectures, delivered to an all-white
audience, are particularly revealing.
Although Harlan recognized that the United States was comprised of
persons of many different racial and ethnic backgrounds, he told his
10

Harlan’s constitutional lectures will be published in 2013 by Carolina Academic Press.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES OF JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (Davison M. Douglas
ed.) (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES].
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students that Anglo-Saxons were the superior race, and that in time, every
11
other racial group in North America would die out. “To my mind, to my
apprehension,” Harlan explained to his students in 1898, “it is as certain as
fate that in the course of time there will be nobody on this North American
12
continent but Anglo-Saxons. All other races are steadily going to the wall.”
Consistent with other contemporary proponents of racial destiny, Harlan
singled out Native Americans as candidates for early extinction, explaining
to his students that they are “a race that is disappearing and probably within
the lifetime of some that are now hearing me, there will be very few in this
13
country. In a hundred years you will probably not find one anywhere . . . .”
Harlan did not celebrate the demise of non-Anglo-Saxon racial groups in
America, but nevertheless saw their elimination as inevitable.
Harlan’s claim about Anglo-Saxon dominance contained strong echoes
of Josiah Strong’s widely-read book with which Harlan was undoubtedly
familiar, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, first published in
1885, and republished in revised form in 1891. Consistent with Harlan’s
views of Anglo-Saxon dominance, Strong—a prominent Protestant
clergyman—argued that Anglo-Saxons would, in time, displace all other
races:
Whether the extinction of inferior races before the advancing AngloSaxon seems to the reader sad or otherwise, it certainly seems
probable . . . . Is there room for reasonable doubt that [the Anglo-Saxon]
race . . . is destined to dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others,
14
and mold the remainder, until . . . it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind?
Harlan’s views expressed in his 1897–1898 constitutional law lectures were
consistent with the Strong’s views about racial destiny.
Despite Harlan’s embrace of theories of racial supremacy, what
distinguished him from other jurists of his era was his belief that AngloSaxons would sustain their superior place in the racial hierarchy only to the
extent that they vigorously protected the constitutional liberty of all
11
12
13
14

See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY: ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISIS 224–25
(1885). Strong wrote that “by the close of the [twentieth] century, the Anglo-Saxons will
outnumber all the other civilized races of the world.” Id. at 213. Strong’s ideas would not
have been novel to Harlan. As a boy, Harlan read the works of many nineteenth-century
historians who wrote of the providential destiny of Anglo-Saxons in North America.
LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 119 (1999).
Harlan’s constitutional law lectures contain strong echoes of Strong’s ideas—the
superiority of Anglo-Saxons to other racial groups, the special role of Anglo-Saxons in the
preservation of liberty, the dangers posed by the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons, the
expected extinction of non-Anglo-Saxons in North America, and optimism about
America’s future under the leadership of Anglo-Saxons.
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American citizens, particularly African Americans, for whom the denial of
liberty had been particularly profound.
15
In Harlan’s famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, issued one
year prior to his 1897–1898 constitutional law lectures, Harlan explained the
role of Anglo-Saxons in the preservation of liberty. In that opinion, Harlan
noted that “the white race”—a term synonymous with Harlan’s conception
16
of “the Anglo-Saxon race” —“deems itself to be the dominant race in this
17
country.” Harlan agreed with that assessment of dominance: “And so it is,
18
in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.”
Harlan, however, believed that this Anglo-Saxon dominance would
continue only so long as Anglo-Saxons remained faithful to their obligation
to preserve Anglo-American traditions of liberty: “So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be [the dominant race] for all time, if it remains true to its great
19
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.”
Hence, for
Harlan, the protection of “the principles of constitutional liberty,”
particularly for African Americans, whose rights had long been egregiously
disregarded, was a sacred obligation for Anglo-Saxons and the key to their
20
continued dominance.
Harlan spent considerable time in his 1897–1898 constitutional law
lectures explaining to his students the critical role that Anglo-Saxons had
historically played in the protection of human liberty, dating back to the
Magna Carta. In his opening lecture in October 1897, Harlan observed that
Anglo-Saxons “are the custodians of the principles of liberty which must
prevail to the end, that men shall enjoy that freedom of speech and action
21
which is essential to the security of life, liberty, and property.”
15
16
17
18
19

20

21

163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan frequently referred to the “Anglo-Saxon race.” See, e.g., John Marshall Harlan,
Lecture 25 (Apr. 30, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra note 10.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). Harlan noted in his Plessy dissent that “[e]very true man has pride
of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before
the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride. . . .” Id. at 554. So,
for Harlan, with respect to the civil and political rights that every American citizen
enjoyed, principles of equal treatment must be respected, but expressions of racial and
ethnic pride were appropriate. Harlan himself certainly had great pride in his AngloSaxon ancestry.
For Harlan, lawyers played a critical role in this stewardship: “[I]t is true in the history of
all the Anglo-Saxon race, and many other races, that it is the lawyer who has stepped
forward and has put himself in the way of arbitrary power to defend the rights of man.”
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 2 (Oct. 21, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10.
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 1 (Oct. 14, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10. For Harlan, the protection of “life, liberty, and property” was central to his
concept of Anglo-Saxon liberty, and the jury was the central mechanism for ensuring that
liberty was appropriately protected. Harlan explained his conception of the rights
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Harlan believed that the United States would become the greatest nation
on earth during the twentieth century—but only if it remained true to its
call to preserve Anglo-American traditions of constitutional liberty. He told
his students in 1898 that the United States was the nation most likely “to
shape the destinies of Europe and [of] the far eastern countries and of the
22
whole human race in the next century.” “But,” said Harlan, “the nation
would fulfill its role as world leader only if it maintained its position as the
23
world’s greatest defender of the ‘rights of man.’”
Central to Harlan’s constitutional jurisprudence was his view that the
United States Constitution was part of God’s providential design to preserve
24
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberty in America. Harlan’s view of American
history was heavily influenced by his belief that God was actively involved in
human affairs and used certain individuals and events to help the nation
fulfill its sacred destiny as the world’s great defender of human liberty.
Hence, for Harlan, the preservation of Anglo-Saxon traditions of liberty in
the United States was a sacred call and essential to the nation’s fulfillment of
its destiny.
Harlan likened the settlement of Anglo-Saxons in North America in the
seventeenth century to the coming of the Kingdom of God of which Jesus

22
23

24

protected by the Constitution in a 1900 lecture at the University of Pennsylvania: “When
I speak of liberty, I mean such liberty as is enjoyed in this country[that] recognizes the
right of all persons within its jurisdiction, of whatever race, to the equal protection of laws
in every matter affecting life, liberty, or property.” Justice Harlan’s Oration, PHILA. PRESS, Feb.
22, 1900, microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16
(emphasis added).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 26 (May 7, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10.
In 1900, Harlan said of the United States: “The time is certain to arrive, if this people
remain true to their great destiny, when our nation will be, if it has not already become,
the most powerful factor in all movements that affect the peace of the world and the
rights of man.” Mr. Justice Harlan Reviews The Country’s Constitution, N. AM. (Feb. 22,
1900), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16.
Harlan’s dual commitments to his Christian faith and constitutional liberty were central
organizing principles in his life and in his work as a Supreme Court Justice. Justice David
Brewer joked that Harlan went to sleep “with one hand on the Constitution and the other
on the Bible.” Justice Harlan Dined, WASH. EVENING STAR, Dec. 10, 1902, microformed on
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16. Harlan, in response, noted: “I
do not . . . remember to have gone to bed with the Bible in one hand and the
Constitution in the other, but I fully believe in both the Bible and the Constitution.”
James B. Morrow, Talks with Notable Men: John M. Harlan, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 25,
1906, microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 16. At a
tribute for Harlan following his death, Attorney General George Wickersham observed:
“The Constitution and the Bible were the objects of his constant thought and
consideration, and if the latter was to him always vox Dei, the former . . . was no less so.”
Proceedings on the Death of Mr. Justice Harlan, 222 U.S. v, at xii (1911).
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25

spoke. He also explained that certain eighteenth-century historical figures
such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had been “raised up” as a
“special Providence” to help found the nation with its central commitment
26
to liberty.
Harlan saw the Civil War in similar terms. In Harlan’s view, the nation’s
fundamental commitment to liberty, first articulated in the Declaration of
Independence, had been profoundly betrayed by the nation’s ongoing
embrace of slavery—an institution that in his view was the greatest evil in
27
American history. But, for Harlan, the Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in
28
Dred Scott v. Sanford, which helped provoke the war, was a
special Providence to this country in that it laid the foundation of a civil
war which, terrible as it was, awful as it was in its consequences in the loss
of life and money, was in the end a blessing to this country in that it rid
29
us of the institution of African slavery.
Harlan also saw both Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant as
30
providential figures raised up by God to help the nation rid itself of slavery.
25

26

27

28
29
30

Harlan compared “the planting of seeds of voluntary government” in British North
America to the parable of the planting of the mustard seed that Jesus used to explain the
concept of the Kingdom of God: “[Whereunto shall we liken the kingdom of God?] [A]
mustard seed, which, when it is sown in the earth, [is] less than all the seeds that [be] in
the earth. But when it is sown, it groweth up, and becometh greater than all . . . [the
herbs, and] shooteth out great branches; so that the fowls of the air may lodge under the
shadow of it.” John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 2 (Oct. 21, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LECTURES, supra note 10 (quoting Mark 4:31–32 (King James)).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 20 (Mar. 19, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10. Harlan elaborated:
We sometimes are in the habit in our ordinary conversation of speaking of
particular things which have occurred as Providence: ‘That was a special
Providence.’ We say that George Washington was a special Providence, that he was
raised up for the work he did, and that no other man could have done the work so
far as we can tell that he did.
Id. Harlan also viewed Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, as “a
special Providence” who had done work “that no other man could have performed.” Id.
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 26 (May 7, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10 (“It is well for us that [slavery] is gone, never to be restored. And whatever the
perils may be against which this country will have to contend, they will be a less[er] evil
than was the existence of African slavery in this country.”).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 20 (Mar. 19, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10.
Id. Harlan’s strong statements on slavery are particularly striking, given his personal
history as a member of a slaveholding family and as an early opponent of the
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH,
JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 61 (1995); Alan F. Westin, John Marshall
Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE
L.J. 637, 638 (1957). Harlan’s views on race, however, underwent a significant
transformation during the late 1860s and early 1870s. Harlan was appalled at the
continuing violence against southern blacks during Reconstruction and viewed southern
resistance to the new constitutional order as threatening to the Union. Accordingly,
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A devout Calvinist who at one point considered resigning from the Supreme
Court to devote his life to building a Presbyterian “cathedral” in
31
Washington, D.C., Harlan saw his dual commitments to constitutional
32
liberty and his Presbyterian faith as inextricably intertwined.

II. HARLAN AND THE IMMIGRATION OF NON-ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE
UNITED STATES
Consistent with his views of racial hierarchy, Harlan expressed grave
concern about the presence of non-Anglo-Saxon racial and ethnic groups in
the United States who he feared were unlikely to assimilate to American
democratic traditions and embrace the nation’s commitment to the
protection of individual liberty. Indeed, in Harlan’s view, the greatest threat
to the nation was the immigration to the United States of hundreds of
thousands of non-Anglo-Saxons from Eastern and Southern Europe and
33
China who were not steeped in the traditions of Anglo-American liberty.
This concern about immigration posed a fundamental conflict for
Harlan. Though he was the greatest promoter of constitutional liberty on
the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, he was also one of his
era’s great proponents of using the nation’s immigration laws to screen out
what he believed to be undesirable racial and ethnic groups.

31
32

Harlan became an enthusiastic supporter of the Fourteenth Amendment and of black
rights during the 1870s. See generally Westin, supra note 30 (discussing the evolution of
Justice Harlan’s civil rights jurisprudence over the span of his lifetime).
Justice Harlan May Quit Bench, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1906, at 1.
Late in his life, Harlan observed: “I never think of the American constitutional system
without being proud of the Presbyterian Church. Liberty regulated by law and
Presbyterianism are . . . so linked together historically that a Presbyterian, at least, cannot
well think of one without thinking of the other.” Nestor of the High Tribunal, WASH. POST,
Apr. 16, 1905, at E7. Harlan cited with approval historian James Froude who claimed that
Calvinism, Harlan’s religious tradition, was “the creed of republics.” Id. (quoting JAMES
ANTHONY FROUDE, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE FALL OF WOLSEY TO THE DEATH OF
ELIZABETH 376 (1871)). Again, Harlan’s views track those of Josiah Strong, one of the
most prominent Protestant clergymen of the late nineteenth century. Strong, in his
widely read book, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, extolled AngloSaxon commitments to liberty in terms similar to Harlan:
The Anglo-Saxon is representative of two great ideas, which are closely related.
One of them is that of civil liberty. Nearly all of the civil liberty of the world is
enjoyed by Anglo-Saxons . . . . The other great idea of which the Anglo-Saxon is
the exponent is that of a pure spiritual Christianity . . . . It follows, then, that the
Anglo-Saxon, as the great representative of these two ideas . . . sustains peculiar
relations to the world’s future, [and] is divinely commissioned to be, in a peculiar
sense, his brother’s keeper.
STRONG, supra note 14, at 208–10 (emphasis in original).

33

See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10 (describing immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons as a “real peril that is before
us”).
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Harlan’s concerns about the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons to the
United States were widely shared. For example, Ellwood Cubberley, a
distinguished social scientist at Stanford University, writing in the early
twentieth century, described the effects of the increase in non-Anglo-Saxon
immigration that took place during the final two decades of the nineteenth
century: “About 1882, the character of our immigration changed in a very
remarkable manner. Immigration from the north of Europe dropped off
rather abruptly, and in its place immigration from the south and east of
34
Europe set in and soon developed into a great stream.” In language with
which Harlan would have agreed, Cubberley observed that:
These [S]outhern and [E]astern Europeans are of a very different type
from the [N]orth Europeans who preceded them. Illiterate, docile,
lacking in self-reliance and initiative, and not possessing the AngloTeutonic conceptions of law, order, and government, their coming has
served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our civic
35
life.
Cubberley argued that “[o]ur task is to . . . assimilate and amalgamate these
people as a part of our American race, and to implant in their children, so
far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law and
36
order, and popular government.”
Whereas Cubberley counseled
assimilation as the answer, Harlan worried that certain racial and ethnic
groups—particularly the Chinese—would not, in fact, assimilate into
37
American political and constitutional traditions.
Harlan feared that political control in many of the nation’s great cities
had been captured by non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants who did not embrace
American traditions of civil liberty. He told his students:
In the large cities that are the source of most of the dangers that threaten
our American civilization, men are invested with the privilege of
citizenship of the United States under these naturalization laws who have
not the slightest idea about our institutions, who scarcely know our
language, whose habits have been formed up past manhood in other
lands, under other systems of government, and who never do understand
38
our civilization as we . . . who were born here [understand it].

34
35
36
37

38

ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION 14 (Henry Suzzallo ed.,
1909).
Id. at 15.
Id.
See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10 (describing immigrants in large cities as “the source of most of the dangers
that threaten our American civilization”); John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29,
1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra note 10 (discussing the “real peril”
created by large numbers of immigrants in U.S. cities).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10.
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“There is not much danger to the future of this country, in my judgment,”
Harlan explained, “[other than] the large cities of the country that
dominate the states, whose votes [will] . . . decide the politics of this country
39
for years to come.”
For Harlan, ethnic-based machine politics in cities such as New York and
Chicago were of particular concern. Harlan explained:
Go to the great city of New York. Why, some men have said that it is
more European than American. [There is] a good deal of truth in it.
The contests in [the] great states of this country have turned upon the
votes of great cities. And those great cities have a majority of men—or
[an] enormous percentage of men—not born and reared under our
institutions, not born and reared under the institutions of other
countries like England . . . understand[ing] what life, liberty, and
property mean, but born under despotisms, who have been in the habit
all their lives of bowing to titles and powers that did not know what
liberty was, and who come to this country mistaking liberty for license
40
and license for liberty.
Because of the large number of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants in certain
states, Harlan told his students that he took comfort in the equal
representation requirement in the U.S. Senate that operated to reduce the
influence of certain states with large non-Anglo-Saxon immigrant
41
populations, such as Illinois and New York.
Though Harlan worried about immigration from Southern and Eastern
Europe, he expressed even greater concern about the Chinese. Although
Congress, in 1882, had enacted legislation imposing a moratorium on
42
additional Chinese immigration, Harlan feared that America’s borders,
39

40

41
42

Id. Harlan also thought that many of these Southern and Eastern European immigrants
had unsavory backgrounds. He complained that
our own doors are open practically to all the world, and the jails and penitentiaries
of Europe are being emptied into this country, and large portions of them lodge
in these great cities that are now becoming so large and so corrupt that they are
substantially controlling the public policy of many of the states, despite what the
people out in the country and away from such cities may want.
Id.
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 4 (Oct. 30, 1897), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10. According to the 1900 census, each of the ten most populous cities in the
United States had a substantial foreign-born population. Even when those persons born
in the British Isles are excluded, the foreign-born population percentage in 1900 in the
nation’s ten most populous cities was quite substantial: New York City (26%), Chicago
(28%), Philadelphia (12%), St. Louis (14%), Boston (19%), Baltimore (11%), Cleveland
(25%), Buffalo (24%), San Francisco (26%), and Cincinnati (14%). See 1 DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1900:
POPULATION PART I, at clxvii–clxxix tbls. LXXVIII–LXXXIII (1901).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10.
In 1882, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act that imposed a moratorium on
additional immigration of Chinese into the United States. Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L.
No. 47-71 (1882), repealed by Magnuson Act, Pub. L. No. 78-199; 57 Stat. 600 (1943); see
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particularly its northern border with Canada, were vulnerable to the illegal
immigration of persons of Chinese ancestry, a problem made worse by the
43
fact that, to Harlan, the Chinese “all look alike.” Harlan argued that it is “a
little difficult to enforce that [exclusion] law, particularly because of the
invisible line that separates this country from Canada. They can land at
Victoria [in British Columbia] and there is a wide space of country all along
44
between the United States and Canada through which they can come.”
Addressing his constitutional law students in 1898, at a time when the U.S.
population was about seventy-five million, Harlan claimed that had Congress
not chosen to bar future Chinese immigration in 1882, the American West
would have been flooded with fifty million Chinese immigrants, and “[t]hey
would have rooted out the American population” in that part of the
45
country.
Harlan favored the exclusion of Chinese from America on the grounds
that they were “a race utterly foreign to us and never will assimilate with
46
us.”
Harlan explained that the Chinese “are pagans in religion, so
different from us that they do not inter-marry with us. And we don’t want to
inter-marry with them. And whey [sic] they die, no matter how long they
have been here, they make arrangements to be sent back to their
47
fatherland.” Harlan believed that the Chinese, even those born within the
United States, retained loyalty to their homeland and hence possessed an
48
uncertain commitment to American democratic traditions.

43
44

45
46
47
48

also ANDREW GYOY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT
1–2 (1998).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10.
Id. In fact, many Chinese immigrated to British Columbia, Canada, during the late
nineteenth century and then crossed the border into the United States illegally. The port
of Victoria in British Columbia was a particularly popular immigration site, and the
United States-Canada border was not heavily guarded. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATE:
CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943, at 152–55 (2003).
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 20 (Mar. 19, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
Harlan’s oft-noted comments about the Chinese in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent must be
read through the prism of his anti-Chinese views. That the Louisiana segregation law at
issue in Plessy imposed a much harsher regime on blacks than on Chinese deeply
disturbed Harlan:
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging
to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.
But by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach
with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race in
Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the
Union . . . are yet declared to be criminals . . . if they ride in a public coach
occupied by citizens of the white race.
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As a result of Harlan’s concerns about non-Anglo-Saxon immigration, he
was an enthusiastic proponent of race-based immigration policies, and
believed that immigration reform was perhaps the most pressing issue in the
49
nation. Harlan applauded the nation’s decision in 1882 to stop Chinese
immigration and favored immigration policies that made explicit racial
distinctions in determining which groups should be permitted to immigrate
to the United States. Harlan explained: “The power of the government of
the United States to exclude any particular people from our shores is
beyond question. We could exclude any particular race anywhere on the
50
earth from our country by an act of Congress . . . .” As a Supreme Court
Justice, Harlan joined the Court’s 1892 decision in Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, which gave Congress broad latitude to make racial distinctions in its
51
immigration policy. Harlan returned to this immigration theme again and
again throughout his constitutional law lectures, telling his students that
“the greatest farce” of the nineteenth century has been the nation’s

49

50
51

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Though this
observation about the Chinese was not essential to his conclusion about the
constitutionality of the Louisiana segregation law, Harlan found it particularly galling that
the law treated the Chinese more favorably than it did blacks. Harlan would continue to
worry about what he perceived to be the Chinese menace for the remainder of his life. In
1908, three years before his death, Harlan, speaking of the Chinese, warned in a widely
noted speech that it was inevitable that there would someday be a military conflict
“between the yellow race and the white race that will shake the earth.” Harlan Prophecies A
Great Race War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1908, at 3. Accordingly, Harlan urged Congress to
build the greatest navy in the world that could defend the nation and make every
American port impregnable to Chinese attack. Justice Harlan’s Plans, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
1908, at 5. United States Senator Albert Beveridge congratulated Harlan on his speech
on the Chinese threat, calling it a “bugle blast of Americanism.” Letter from Albert J.
Beveridge to John Marshall Harlan (Feb. 9, 1908), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL
HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 13.
See John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 11 (Jan. 8, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10. Harlan told his students that immigration reform was one of the most
important issues facing the nation:
If there is any one duty resting upon this country at this time that is supreme in my
opinion it is the necessity to reorganize that whole system [of naturalization] and
to see to it that American citizenship does not become as cheap in the future as it
has been in the past.
Id.
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 14 (Jan. 29, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES,
supra note 10.
142 U.S. 651 (1892). In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court noted with approval that Congress had
plenary authority over immigration, was free to forbid “the immigration of particular
classes of foreigners,” and acted constitutionally when it barred Chinese immigration. Id.
at 659–60; see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that the
Chinese Exclusion Act was a constitutional exercise of legislative power).
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permissive immigration laws that opened the nation’s doors to so many non52
Anglo-Saxons.
Harlan also took the view that Congress had broad latitude in making
race-based distinctions in granting citizenship rights. In United States v. Wong
53
Kim Ark, Harlan joined a dissenting opinion concluding that a child of
Chinese parents, though born in the United States and hence within the
ambit of the birthright citizenship language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was nevertheless not a citizen because, in his view, the child
54
and his parents remained loyal subjects of the Emperor of China. Harlan
explained his decision in this case to his students: “My belief was [that we]
never intended to embrace everybody in our citizenship . . . [such as] the
child of parents who cannot, under the law, become naturalized
55
[citizens] . . . of the United States.”
Later, speaking of birthright
citizenship, Harlan concluded that place of birth should not control: “Just
56
because a cat has kittens in an oven is no sign they are biscuits.”
Although Harlan opposed immigration and citizenship rights for
Chinese, he did dissent from opinions denying Chinese aliens lawfully living
57
in the United States certain rights.
Moreover, while most of Harlan’s
judicial colleagues viewed Native Americans as non-citizens and hence

52

53
54

55
56

57

Harlan also joined opinions sustaining the constitutionality of certain immigration
procedures tainted with racial classifications. For example, in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), Harlan joined the Court’s opinion providing that Congress
had plenary authority to determine the conditions under which an alien was expelled
from the country, even if the expulsion process raised issues of racial discrimination.
Justice Brewer condemned the majority, noting that the while “[t]he expulsion of a race
may be within the inherent powers of a despotism,” Congress had no authority to
determine “whether whole classes in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race
and birthplace, be driven from our territory.” Id. at 737–38 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
169 U.S. 649 (1898).
Id. at 705–06 (Fuller, J., dissenting, with whom Harlan, J., concurred). Justice Clarence
Thomas has written that “on Harlan’s principles Chinese and anyone who undertook the
duties of citizenship could become citizens.” Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading”
of the Constitution—The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW.
L.J. 983, 994 (1987). That assertion is inconsistent with Harlan’s citizenship opinions
regarding the Chinese.
John Marshall Harlan, Lecture 26 (May 7, 1898), in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW LECTURES, supra
note 10.
Enoch Aquila Chase, Some Recollections of Justice John Marshall Harlan (unpublished
and undated), microformed on JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN PAPERS, supra note 6, at Reel 13
(Chase was a student in one of Harlan’s classes).
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with Court’s decision to release a man from custody who had forcefully removed lawful
Chinese aliens from their homes). See generally Earl M. Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind:
John Marshall Harlan’s View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 973, 999–1016
(1996) (noting the difference between Harlan’s decisions in immigration cases, in which
Harlan was very harsh towards the Chinese, and his decisions in cases involving the rights
of lawful residents, in which he was very protective of the rights of the Chinese).
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outside the protection of the Reconstruction-era amendments, Harlan
58
disagreed. In Elk v. Wilkens, the Court held that a Native American, though
born in the United States and not living on a reservation, was not a citizen
and hence enjoyed no voting rights unless he had been naturalized. Harlan
dissented, concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment granted citizenship rights to all Native Americans who “had
59
60
severed their tribal connections.” Similarly, in Talton v. Mayes, Harlan was
a lone dissenter in a case in which the Court held that the constitutional
right to a grand jury indictment did not extend to Native Americans on trial
61
in tribal courts.
Harlan’s views on the application of the procedural protections of the
Bill of Rights to tribal courts was consistent with his dissenting opinions in
62
the Insular Cases, in which Harlan argued that the protections of the Bill of
Rights extended to persons living in U.S. territories acquired during the
Spanish-American War. These dissenting opinions must be viewed through
the prism of Harlan’s central commitment to the preservation of AngloAmerican traditions of liberty for all persons subject to the jurisdiction of
63
American law. In Downes v. Bidwell, for example, the Court held that the
Bill of Rights did not apply in the newly acquired U.S. territories. The Court
justified its position by observing that “those possessions are inhabited by
alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation,
and modes of thought,” and so, “the administration of government and
64
justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible.”
The Court argued that “principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo58
59
60
61
62

63
64

112 U.S. 94 (1884).
Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
Id. Harlan dissented without opinion.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914);
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516
(1905); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. &
Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). The Insular Cases were a collection of
several cases decided in the early twentieth century in which the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the application of the Bill of Rights to territory acquired during the SpanishAmerican War. In these cases, the Court held that because it was not envisioned that
these territories would ever enjoy statehood, the Bill of Rights did not apply. See Alan
Tauber, The Empire Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 147, 148 (2006) (“[In the Insular Cases], the Supreme Court ruled that
these lands were ‘foreign in a domestic sense’ and that they were not a part of the United
States for all constitutional purposes.”).
182 U.S. 244 (1901).
Id. at 287.
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65

Saxon character” would offer sufficient protection of the interests of those
persons living in the territories.
Harlan, in dissent, criticized the Court, claiming that its actions
66
suggested the end of “the era of constitutional liberty.”
Harlan argued
that:
The wise men who framed the Constitution, and the patriotic people
who adopted it, were unwilling to depend for their safety upon what, in
the opinion [of the Court], is described as “certain principles of natural
justice inherent in Anglo-Saxon character . . . .” They well remembered
that Anglo-Saxons across the ocean had attempted, in defiance of law
and justice, to trample upon the rights of Anglo-Saxons on this
67
continent . . . [and to] destroy the privileges that inhere in liberty.
As for the problem of the assimilation of alien peoples—a problem with
which Harlan was quite sympathetic—Harlan concluded that:
Whether a particular race will or will not assimilate with our people, and
whether they can or cannot with safety to our institutions be brought
within the operation of the Constitution, is a matter to be thought of
when it is proposed to acquire their territory by treaty. A mistake in the
acquisition of territory . . . cannot be made the ground for violating the
Constitution or refusing to give full effect to its provisions. The
Constitution is not to be obeyed or disobeyed as the circumstances of a
68
particular crisis in our history may suggest . . . .
For Harlan, in the same way that America’s treatment of African
Americans was a test of the nation’s commitment to Anglo-American
principles of liberty, so, too, America’s treatment of its subject peoples in its
newly acquired territories was also a profound test of the nation’s
commitment to liberty. Regardless of whether it was wise to exercise control
over certain foreign territories, the United States was now obliged, in
Harlan’s view, to extend to these peoples the full protection of the Bill of
Rights.

CONCLUSION
Harlan was the most passionate voice on the United States Supreme
Court during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the rights
of African Americans, and one of the most passionate voices defending the
liberty interests of those non-white persons living in territories acquired in
the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Harlan’s contemporary
reputation as one of the great defenders of civil rights is based largely on his
dissenting opinions in these cases.
65
66
67
68

Id. at 280.
Id. at 379 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 381.
Id. at 384.
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This strong commitment to protecting the liberty of “outsider” groups
appears to be in sharp tension with Harlan’s embrace of a racial hierarchy
with Anglo-Saxons as the superior racial group, and his opposition to the
immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons to the United States. But Harlan’s
conception of racial hierarchy operated within a framework of racial
paternalism: Anglo-Saxons would maintain their racial dominance only to
the extent that they fulfilled their sacred mission to protect Anglo-American
traditions of constitutional liberty for all people living within the nation’s
jurisdiction, even outsider groups destined for extinction. And so, John
Marshall Harlan, a firm believer in racial supremacy and a strong opponent
of the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons, was nevertheless his era’s greatest
judicial proponent of constitutional liberty.

